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In the era of rapidly advancing technologies and global 
corporations, striking the balance between protecting 
the Intellectual Property Rights of inventors and 
securing fair competition on the market poses a 
challenge to decision-makers and the industry alike. 
Multiple interests and priorities are at stake – 
companies invest heavily in R&D activities to gain a 
competitive advantage, expecting a high return on their 
inventions, while implementers want to access patented 
products at low prices. Once patents are included in 
industry standards and become Standard Essential 
Patents (SEPs) or when patent holders enjoy a dominant 
position on the market, Intellectual Property law 
interacts with competition concerns, having a potential 
impact on innovators, producers and, ultimately, the 
consumers. 
 
Recently, the discussion on rules for licensing of patents 
essential to standards in the EU has appeared on the 
agendas of both the European Commission and the Court 
of Justice. In 2014, DG Enterprise and Industry (now DG 
Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) 
published an extensive report on Patents and Standards. 
Together with the ensuing public consultation, it is part of 
the process designed to create a common European 
framework for the licensing of patents essential to 
standards. At the same time, in July 2015, the Court of 
Justice issued a judgment in the Huawei v. ZTE case, 
taking a stance in the discussion on the rights and 
obligations of patent holders and licensees by ruling on 
the issue of injunctions being sought by dominant 
companies against SEP implementers.  
 
While the Commission has embarked on an ambitious 
path of creating a legislative proposal, it appears unclear 
what exactly are the issues that it aims to tackle and how 
the new set up would improve the existing arrangements. 
This Policy Brief argues that it could be better for 
consumers if the current policies were left in place, 
allowing the market to respond to new challenges and 
create solutions appropriate in each sector or even in 
individual cases. More rules might constitute a burden, 
rather than a solution. 
 
What is at stake? 
 
In designing the new policy, the Commission recognises 
that standardisation plays an essential role in assuring 
interoperability across devices, especially crucial in the 
ICT sector. The stakes appear high if we consider that 
standards such as 3G and GSM in mobile telephony can 
include over 23,500 SEPs (Jones 2014). Moreover, SEP 
holders see standardisation as a source of profit – for 
example, Apple’s revenue per patent in 2014 exceeded 
Executive Summary 
> Incentivising innovation and ensuring competition 
on the market at the same time can be conflicting. 
> The European Commission intends to create a 
new European Framework for Patents and 
Standards, but it remains unclear what exactly are 
its goals. 
> The public consultation reveals diverging views of 
private actors vis-à-vis public authorities. 
> Fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing 
of patents essential to standards is not clearly 
defined in the Commission’s proposal, leaving 
room for abuses, whereas the current system 
provides a toolbox that industry actors regard as 
well-functioning. 
> The Commission’s focus might be displaced, 
potentially leading to negative consequences for 
the market and the consumers. 
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$16,500 (Lloyd 2015). This further motivates companies 
to partake in the standard-setting process but 
simultaneously puts pressure on licensees in the 
negotiations of royalties. Industry actors also agree that 
appropriate compensation for SEPs is essential to 
maintain innovation incentives. Yet those equally 
concerned are consumers or the 1.15 million users of 
mobile phones in Europe who prefer affordable prices for 
their devices (Statistica 2016). 
 
The Commission aims to ensure efficient licensing of SEPs 
by improving the system of patent declaration, 
promoting patent pools, assuring well-functioning 
dispute resolution mechanisms, harmonising transfer of 
SEP ownership, and clarifying Fair, Reasonable and Non-
discriminatory (FRAND) conditions for licensing. However, 
two important issues arise: first, how should appropriate 
compensation fees be established? And second, how 
should negotiations of these royalties be conducted? 
 
Defining Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) conditions 
Regarding the definition of compensation terms, 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) typically require 
holders of SEPs to agree, during the standard-setting 
process, to license their IPR on FRAND terms. To date, 
however, no clear definition of the meaning of FRAND 
has been established. Deciding upon FRAND rates is a 
complex issue, in terms of not only the actual price 
determination but also the negotiation toolkit available 
to both licensors and licensees.  
 
According to the Commission’s report, there are several 
characteristics that a FRAND licensing system should 
have. First of all, it should result in appropriate royalty 
fees for SEP holders. Secondly, there should be a set of 
clear negotiating rules, giving both the licensors and the 
licensees sufficient time to consider the other’s 
proposals. Thirdly, the parties need to have recourse to 
third-party arbitration, be it by courts or alternative 
dispute mechanisms. In essence, a well-functioning 
framework would stimulate innovation by all industry 
participants and not only the dominant undertakings. 
However, this can only be achieved through limiting the 
financial and time-related costs of possessing SEPs as well 
as implementing them. Consequently, this ties in with the 
ultimate logic behind both IP and competition policies, 
namely benefiting consumers by providing a wide choice 
of high-quality products at reasonable prices. 
The Court of Justice has consequently avoided tackling 
the definition of FRAND terms, as seen in the Huawei v. 
ZTE judgment. The lack of clear guidelines for 
quantification of FRAND royalties leaves room for abuses 
and consequently licenses being sold at prices that are 
either too low for SEP holders or too high for 
implementers. As pointed out by Intel, the violations of 
FRAND commitments might endanger the 
standardisation process as well as negatively impact 
competition and innovation in a given sector. Those 
harmed will be end consumers who could face increased 
prices and ensuing welfare losses.  
 
It is not clear who should decide on the meaning of 
FRAND terms. SSOs deem the parties involved and courts 
to be responsible for establishing FRAND royalty fees 
through negotiations or arbitration, in case of disputes. 
Similarly, the Court of Milan in the Samsung-Apple case 
notes that SEP holders are the only ones who can suitably 
establish a FRAND royalty because they possess all the 
information about the value of the patent. This view is 
challenged by Microsoft which suggests that SSOs should 
adopt a set of guidelines regarding the factors to be 
taken into account in determining FRAND compensations.  
 
Another challenge is to establish an appropriate 
methodology for defining FRAND licenses. The companies 
involved in public consultation believe royalty rates 
should reflect the value of patented inventions and not 
be seen as source of profit. Microsoft suggests that cost-
based methods should not be used to determine FRAND 
royalty rates and instead only the value of the invention 
should be decisive. At the same time, Apple puts forward 
the concept of “smallest salable patent practicing unit” 
that helps avoid excessive profit being extracted from 
competitive advantage or the fact that the patent 
becomes an SEP.  
 
To many, the current framework can sufficiently protect 
the rights of patent-holders as well as implementers in 
definition of FRAND rates. Serious criticism of the 
Commission’s report comes from Qualcomm, pointing 
out its methodological shortcomings and substantial 
flaws. Qualcomm’s main argument revolves around the 
idea that in fact, the current IPR policies of SSOs provide 
a well-functioning framework for standards and patents. 
This view is supported by the IP Federation which 
highlights that any changes to the current FRAND 
licensing model need to be “based on empirical evidence 
of systemic problems” which seems to be 
lacking. According to the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute, there has not been any confirmed 
case in Europe of patent-holders’ commitments that 
would be either unfair or unreasonable. Even though 
there is no obligations to inform SSOs about licensing 
terms, such a statement might indicate that in fact the 
existing IPR policies of SSOs in Europe lead to royalties 
that are Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory. 
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The right to seek injunctions against implementers  
 
The Commission also intends to clarify the tools that 
should be available to holders of SEPs in the process of 
royalty negotiation. CEN and CENELEC emphasise that the 
right to obtain injunctions is an essential tool available to 
patent holders in disputes with unwilling licensees. 
However, as pointed out by Microsoft, the right to obtain 
injunctions against implementers of SEPs, based on the 
failure of negotiations of FRAND royalties should be 
“extremely limited”. For example, dominant firms in 
possession of SEPs might seek to abuse their position on 
the market to exploit unreasonable royalties from weaker 
competitors. The Huawei v. ZTE judgment clarifies that 
seeking injunctions by dominant firms for their SEPs is 
only possible under special circumstances. These include 
a notification about SEP infringement by the patent 
holder, willingness of both parties to negotiate, 
presentation of a “specific, written offer for a license on 
FRAND terms” and a diligent response to that offer by the 
implementer.  
Similarly to the Court’s view, Apple emphasises that both 
the licensor and the licensee need to be “willing” in the 
negotiation of FRAND-rates, implying transparency, 
robust methodology and information-sharing in the 
process. These conditions underline the fact that 
ensuring consistent enforcement methods of FRAND 
commitments by establishing transparent royalty 
negotiation rules might be more important than defining 
FRAND terms. 
Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent 
injunctions constitute a genuine concern for the 
efficiency of SEP licensing. While the clarification from 
the Court provides some legal certainty, many more 
essential concerns have not been addressed. It has been 
observed that in the UK, for example, preliminary 
injunctions are rarely sought or granted, due to possible 
damage actions, should the injunction be declared 
invalid. This example shows that not only are injunctions 
an exceptional tool in patent disputes between holders of 
SEPs and licensees but also there already exist effective 
retaliation measures, such as damage actions, where 
abuses of injunctions are detected. It seems that the 
existing rules on injunctions work rather well in assuring 
efficient licensing of SEPs. 
 
 
 
 
The less, the better? 
 
The Commission’s strategy can be criticised for being too 
broad and lacking focus. While attempting to provide a 
comprehensive framework for patents and standards, it 
covers areas that do not need regulation and leaves out 
the most contentious issues, including a clear FRAND 
definition. The risk is that instead of improving the 
current system, the Commission could fail to find 
consensus on unsubstantial issues and therefore might 
not be able to deliver on the pressing problems.  
 
If we consider that the current system is working well, 
the recommendation for the Commission would be to put 
its legislative process on hold and let the market and 
SSOs work out their best practices. However, as that is 
unlikely to happen, the Commission could benefit from 
taking a step back and redefining the exact goals that its 
framework should achieve. The possible alternatives 
include a detailed top-down definition of FRAND terms 
and more power of SSOs in the process of negotiations of 
licenses or less focus on creating binding commitments 
and more transparency of the royalty-definition process 
and better dispute resolution tools instead.  
 
The companies concerned worry about their returns for 
R&D, in the case of SEP holders, or costs of production for 
implementers. However, the ultimate impact of royalty 
rates is on consumer welfare which can be harmed by 
inefficient and protracted procedures. Since the 
framework for standards and patents is not currently on 
top of the Commission’s agenda, the industry players as 
well as SSOs and public authorities are given a chance to 
ensure that when the legislative proposal emerges, it will 
bring a change for the better, rather than worsen the 
apparently well-functioning status quo. The challenge is 
multifaceted, the policy goals are ambitious, and the 
stakes high. 
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